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U

The Corporate Director's

Duty of Oversight
by Mark J Loewenstein

Corporate

directors' fiduciary du-

ties include duties of care and
loyalty. The duty of care is twofold, as directors must exercise
care in both overseeing the corporation's
business as well as in making specific
business decisions. While the duty of oversight has received less attention than the
duty of care in making business decisions,'
a recent Delaware case has made the duty of oversight a timely topic of consideration.
This article discusses two leading Delaware cases and other authorities on the
duty of oversight. It also reviews Colorado case law.

The Duty of Oversight
From Graham to Caremark
Since 1963, the leading Delaware Supreme Court case on the duty of oversight
has been Graham v. Allis-ChalmersMfg.
Co. 2 Graham was a shareholder's derivative action based on antitrust violations
by lower-level managers' price fixing. This
antitrust violation took place without the
knowledge or acquiescence of the AllisChalmers' directors or senior officers. However, the plaintiff's derivative action theorized that if the board had exercised a
proper level of supervision, it would have
discovered this unlawful conduct before it
harmed the corporation.
The plaintiffs theory of the case did not
persuade the Delaware Supreme Court,
which affirmed the Vice Chancellor's dismissal of the action against the directordefendants. The court rejected the argument that directors had an obligation to
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implement a"system ofwatchfulness" with
this observation:
[D]irectors are entitled to rely on the
honesty and integrity of their subordinates until something occurs to put
them on suspicion that something is
wrong. If such occurs and goes unheeded, then liability of the directors might
well follow, but absent cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the directors
to install and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to sus3
pect exists.
Commentators have characterized the Delaware court's pronouncement in Graham
as a "red flag" test--unless the directors
see one they can assume that all is well.
The comforting "red flag" test, however,
may no longer be a reliable standard of
law. In the thirty-five years since Graham
was decided, several developments have
undermined the precedent, indicating that
directors must be more proactive in discharging their duty of oversight. These
developments were highlighted in In re
CaremarkInternationalInc. Derivative
Litigation,4 an opinion written by Chancellor Allen ofthe Delaware Court of Chancery.While a Chancery opinion is typically of lesser precedential value than a Supreme Court opinion, the age of the Graham decision, Chancellor Allen's prominence, and the force of his opinion all suggest otherwise.
Like Graham,Caremarkwas a derivative action that followed disclosure of corporate misconduct. In the case of Caremark, the disclosures revealed that the
company had violated the federal AntiReferral Payments Law, which prohibits
health care providers from paying kickbacks to physicians and others for referring Medicare and Medicaid patients.
Caremark had violated this law, and it
cost the company $250,000,000 to settle

criminal and civil suits. The shareholders
sued the directors on a negligence theory
to recover the corporate losses.
The suit was settled, and Chancellor
Allen had before him the parties' settlement agreement for his approval. Under
the settlement, Caremark agreed to amend
its bylaws to add committees and procedures designed to avoid a repeat ofthe conduct that resulted in the violations. Chancellor Allen found the settlement fair to
the shareholders and agreed to the dismissal. However, he also used the opportunity to define the directors' duty of oversight, which duty was the basis ofthe plaintiffs complaint.
In Caremark, Chancellor Allen opined
that the Delaware Supreme Court, if faced
with the issue, would no longer endorse
the red flag test.5 Rather, the opinion observed, in the years since the Supreme
Court decided Graham,it had recognized
the increased importance of the board of
directors. Citing Smith v. Van Gorkom6
and Paramountv. QVC,7 the opinion said
that Delaware's jurisprudence makes clear
the "seriousness with which the corporation law views the role of the corporate
board."'
The opinion in Caremarknoted two other factors that weaken the Grahamprecedent. First, under the Delaware corporate code, as in the Colorado Business
Corporation Act, the directors are charged
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with the obligation of monitoring the corporate business,9 and this obligation requires "relevant and timely information 10
Second, the federal sentencing guidelines
have enhanced penalties for corporate violators and provided opportunities for reduced sanctions if certain oversight mechanisms are in place. Both of these factors
suggest a proactive role for the board.
Thus, the opinion concluded, if a corporation violates the law, the directors may be
found responsible, even absent knowledge or grounds for suspicion. According
to Caremark,this would be true unless the
board can demonstrate that "information
and reporting systems exist that are reasonably designed to provide the board with
timely, accurate information sufficient to
allow management and the board, each
within its scope, to reach informed judgments concerning both the corporation's
compliance with law and business per11
formance."
With this principle in mind, the opinion then considered the plaintiffs burden
when alleging a lack of oversight. Plaintiffs must show that the directors demonstrated a "sustained or systematic failure" to exercise oversight, 12 through, for
instance, "an utter failure [on the board's
part] to attempt to assure that a reasonable information and reporting system
13
exists."

Other Sources
Caremarkis not the sole source that suggests a heightened duty of oversight for
corporate directors. The ABA Corporate
Directors Guidebook, the ALI Corporate
Governance Project, and the Business
Roundtable's "Statement of Position on
the Role of Corporate Governance and
American Competitiveness" all suggest
that directors must be proactive in assuring that their company is in compliance
with the law. For instance, the Guidebook
provides:
A director should be satisfied that an
effective system is in place for periodic
and timely reporting to the board on ...
compliance with law and corporate
policies .... 14
There are similar pronouncements in the
other sources.

Colorado Precedents
The Holland Case
Colorado courts have not directly decided any oversight cases raising the kinds
of issues present in Grahamand Caremark, and what scant Colorado precedent
34 / THE CoLoRADo LAWYER/ MAY 1998 / VOL. 27, No. 5

that does exist is somewhat difficult to
characterize. The "leading" Colorado case
on director responsibility, Hollandv. American FoundersLife Insurance Co., 5 illustrates this uncertainty.

"Caremarksuggests that
directors must act to
assure that corporate
policies are being faithfully
discharged and that the
corporation is complying
with the law."

fiduciary duty of oversight as a director of
American Founders. The claim appears to
be that he should not have signed the stock
certificates as secretary of the company
without board authorization. In this regard, it is important to note that suit was
brought against only Holland and Hudson. If the claim were one of failure ofoversight, the remaining six directors would
probably have been named as defendants
as well. Second, Hollandwas decided three
years before Graham,so even if Holland
were characterized as an oversight case,
the continued validity of the holding must
be questioned in light of the factors cited
in Caremark.

The Christy Case
Holland involved a suit by a corporation against one of its directors in which
the corporation alleged a breach of fiduciary duty. As there was no question of
loyalty involved, the alleged breach related to the duty of care. The director in question, Holland, apparently was an unwitting participant to a scheme devised by
Hudson, a fellow director and the president ofAmerican Founders Hudson agreed
to issue American Founders stock to several people in exchange for shares of another corporation, Texas Adams. The American Founders stock was issued to the subscribers without the approval of the American Founders board. Unfortunately, the
Texas Adams' shares received in the exchange were apparently worthless. Holland's role, however, was apparently limited to signing the American Founders'
certificate as secretary of the corporation.
The trial court found Holland liable, but
the Colorado Supreme Court reversed,
holding that "a director and officer of a
business corporation is liable for his own
misconduct and not for the wrongful conduct of other directors or officers unless
he joined with them in perpetrating the
wrong." 6 Read broadly, this statement
suggests that the Colorado court would
not follow the Caremarkprecedent, because Caremarkholds that under certain
circumstances a director may be liable for
the misconduct of others, even if the director did not know of the wrongdoing.
The defendant-director in Holland must
have known that the stock issuance was
unauthorized by the board and therefore
improper, ifnot illegal.
Two points about Holland are worth
noting. First, the defendant Holland was
not accused of failing to discharge his

Another case construing Colorado law,
Christy v. Cambron,17 was decided by the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Like the
Holland decision, which it cites, Christy
fails to shed much light on the oversight
obligation. Christy involved, among other
things, a claim by a group of investors that
their business failed due to the poor management of the defendant. The report of
the case states that the defendant was
charged with breaching "his fiduciary duties as an incorporator under Colorado
law."' 8 Clearly, though, the defendant's
role was greater than that of a mere incorporator, as he established the business
as well as incorporated it. The jury awarded damages to the plaintiffs, but the trial
court granted the defendant's motion for
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed.
As to the plaintiffs claim against the
defendant for breach of fiduciary duty,the
appellate court simply cited Holland to
the effect that directors (and, the court
added, promoters) are liable only for losses "caused by their bad faith or willful and
intentional departure from duty, their
fraudulent breaches of trust, their gross
or willful negligence, or their ultra vires
acts."19 The court did not explain the application of this principle to the facts of
the case, thus implying that the defendant's conduct must not have been egregious. Christy may be characterized as a
decision-making case rather than an oversight case, as the defendant was not
charged with failing to discover wrongdoing by others.

Financial Institutions
The Hollandcourt made a point of distinguishing business corporations from
banks: "The directors of a business corporation other than a bank are not held re-

1998

1998

BUSINESS LAW NEWSLETTER

BUSINESS LAW NEWSLETTER

sponsible for mere errors of judgment or ty of oversight, so it is impossible to say
for want of prudence short of clear and what constitutes a negligent breach of that
gross negligence."2° The clear implication duty. If Caremark is an accurate stateof this statement is that directors ofa bank ment of the law, directors are responsible
(or,presumably, a similar financial insti- for implementing compliance law and poltution) are liable for mere negligence. The icy systems for officers and employees. If
leading case on the liability of directors of those systems fail, the directors have done
their part and bear no responsibility for
a Colorado financial institution appears
to be Resolution Thust Corp. v.Heisernan,21 the resulting losses.24 Is the situation difa decision by the U.S. District Court for ferent for banks-that is, are bank directors liable even it acting in good faith and
the District of Colorado.
Heiserman involved, among other in a manner they reasonably believe to be
things, a claim by the RTC that the direc- in the best interests of the corporation,
tors of Capitol Federal Savings and Loan the system they devise fails? Heiserman
Association of Denver were negligent. The does not resolve this question.
Alternatively,Heiserman might be charreport of the case did not point to a single
decision or series of decisions that the di- acterized as a case in which the directors
rectors made in a negligent fashion. Had failed in their decision-making by, for init done so, the case might be character- stance, exercising bad judgment in apized as a challenge to the process that the proving certain loans. Here, too, the landirectors used in making decisions, a clas- guage of negligence does not serve well, besic duty of care claim. Instead, the claim cause the only rational way to judge the diseems to be broader-that the directors rectors' decision-making is to reference the
somehow breached their duty to properly process they employed. The appropriate
oversee the activities of the institution. As questions to ask are whether the directors
to this claim, the court held that directors exercised care in informing themselves
prior to making the decision, whether they
were liable for their mere negligence.
The District Court justified this deci- acted in good faith, and whether they actsion primarily on the basis of the Colora- ed in a manner that they believed was in
do Corporate Code, which applied to this the best interests of the corporation. That
financial institution and provided in per- series of questions cannot be simply characterized as a single question of whether
tinent part that:
A director shall perform his duties as a the directors acted negligently.
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director ... in good faith, in a manner

he reasonably believes to be in the best
interests of the corporation, and with
such care as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use in similar circumstances.
This language, the court concluded, is language of common law negligence.
This statutory section, however, does
not distinguish between the directors of a
business corporation and a financial institution, and Holland had already held
that directors are not liable for their mere
negligence. The District Court recognized
this problem and had basically two answers: first, the Colorado Supreme Court
(in Holland)had indicated that bank directors are held to a higher standard; and
second, the District Court was only deciding the standard of care for directors of a
financial institution, period.'
The Heiserman case is not helpful precedence on the oversight duty, in financial
institutions or business corporations. Concepts of negligence do not translate very
well when considering the oversight function. The Heisermancourt, unlike the Caremark court, gives no hint as to what a director must do to discharge his or her du-

-

Conclusion

x tabs& tax fomunfor EIN &

S corpoion.

Kisw/50dhed bti bendpqm(o BY-L-. d-. pks)
Sawe

$59.95
S59.95
$59.95
$59.95
$25.00
$25.00

AVAILABLE ON DISK $29.95
PC WORD PERFECT 5,6,7 & 8
(S1.50S& H)

To discharge their duty of oversight, directors cannot sit back and assume that
all is well. The Caremarkcase from Delaware, as well as other authorities, suggests that directors must act to assure
that corporate policies are being faithfully discharged and that the corporation is
complying with the law. Colorado law is
less than clear on this subject. What precedent that does exist might be read otherwise, but such a reading may be incorrect. A recent federal district court case,
involving a failed savings and loan, suggests that directors of a financial institution have a higher duty of oversight. In
any event, until the Colorado Supreme
Court rules on the question, some doubt
will remain. The prudent course, however, would follow the guidance provided by
the Caremark case.
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mentary. For a particularly thoughtful article,
see Eisenberg, 'The Director's Duty of Care in
Negotiated Dispositions," 51 U Miami L. Rev.
579(1997).
2. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
3. Id. at 130.
4.698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
5. Id. at 970.
6.488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
7.637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
8. Caremark,supra,note 4 at 970.
9. CRS § 7-108-101(2).
10. Caremark, supra,note 4 at 970.
11. Id.
12.Id. at 971.
13.Id.
14. "Corporate Director's Guidebook-1994
Edition," 49 Bus. Lawyer 1247, 1250 (1994).

15.376 P.2d 162 (Colo. 1962).
16. Id. at 166.
17. 710 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1983).
18. Id. at 670.
19. Id. at 672, quoting from Holland,supra,
note 15 at 165.
20. Id. [Emphasis added.]
21.839 F.Supp. 1457 (D.Colo. 1993).
22. CRS § 7-5-101(2). The corporate code has
since been amended and recodified. The new
section, which is substantially the same as the
provision cited by the court, is found at § 7108-401.
23. Heiserman,supra,note 21 at 1464.
24. Caremark,supra,note 4 at 970.

Criminal Defense Bar Names Olom Award Recipient
The Colorado Criminal Defense Bar ("CCDB") recently named Boulder attorney Michael Enwall as the recipient of the 1998 Jonathan Olom Award.
He will be honored at dinner on May 9 at the Adam's Mark Hotel in Denver.
The Olom Award, the CCDB's highest honor, recognizes an attorney each year
for "outstanding service on behalf of the accused without regard for personal
gain." Tickets for the Olom Dinner are available through the CCDB by calling
(303) 758-2454 in Denver.
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